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1. Introduction.  
At first sight, the problem of finding the best electoral system for a Parliament  cannot be solved, for three main 
reasons. First, some theorems –Arrow's and McKelveys's in primis–  exclude the very possibility of finding out the 
optimal rule. Second, there are too many dimensions  involved (see below): it may be too difficult to balance all of 
them. Finally, the adoption of complex methods appears at odds with the necessity of adopting a rule sufficiently easy 
to be understood and managed by voters. Improvements too technical or too cumbersome (or both) are unlikely to 
command the interest of policymakers.  
   The  objections are not compelling.  It is true that it is impossible to find out the optimal rule, but no theorem 
prohibits to find out an empirical criterion to establish whether a rule is better or worse than another. It is true that the 
electoral system affects a lot of dimensions, but there is a large consensus that some are more important, and it makes 
sense to consider only them. Finally, quite complex rules may be managed and understood by voters. The panoply of 
methods actually adopted here or there is very large, and the reduction of the choice set to them rules out  the objection.  
   It follows that it is possible to find a solution for the problem of choosing the best electoral system, albeit on 
empirical grounds. The meaning of "solution" in this context will be stated in a moment. Before that, we must observe 
that there is no reason why a system should be  always the best one.  In a very divided society, where the political axis 
is very long, majoritarian systems may be very dangerous, as many people may feel too under-represented, possibly to 
the point that the democratic fabric of the society may be at risk (see f.i. Lijphart, 1999). On the opposite, in a very 
compact society there is no need to give away the efficiency of majoritarian Parliaments in exchange for the small 
increases in representation allowed for by proportional rule. From the point of view of public choice, this simple fact 
splits the problem  in two. On one side, there is the problem of choosing the right electoral system in a given situation. 
On the other, there is the problem of the optimal rule for choosing the electoral system. The rule should take into 
account the specificity of given situations.  
  The second problem is obviously  more important, as it includes the first.  I suggest that a choice rule cannot be 
considered a useful  solution for our problem unless three requirements are satisfied. First, for a system to be judged 
"good", and hence "better" or "best", it must be evaluated with reference to some criteria, to be provided by the rule. 
Second, the criteria must be such that the political system may actually employ them, through a sensible decision 
process. Third, the choice of the winning system and its implementation must be viable for political institutions. In other 
words, the solution to the problem "how to choose the best electoral systems for a Parliament" is made of three steps: to 
find an evaluation criterion, to choose the system that best fits with it, and to implement the chosen system. If one or 
more of these steps are too cumbersome, to the point that the political system cannot reasonably manage it, the solution 
is not viable.  
   In this paper I will suggest a solution that appears viable.  It is valid if the relevant dimensions may be reduced 
to two. It should not be too difficult to elaborate an analogous rule for more dimensions, but there is a general 
agreement that the relevant ones are actually two. As the reader will see, the rule is simple and easy both to implement 
and to understand:  all is requested is the statement of the relative weight of the two dimensions.  
  The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the relevant dimensions and the way to assess the  
performance of an electoral system with reference to them. Section 3 explains how to compare electoral systems and 
how to choose the best one. Section 4 argues that the choice may best be made after the vote. Section 5 contains an 
illustration. Conclusions and caveats follow.  
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2. Two dimensions.  
The choice of the electoral system affects a lot of facets of the political process. A quick survey of recent 
literature is sufficient to produce a fourteen, possibly sixteen item list:  the representation of voters' wishes; the 
efficiency in governing; the degree of corruption (Myerson, 1993  and 2001; Persson et al., 2001);  the dimension, type 
and timing of public spending (Persson and Tabellini, 1998 and 2001; Milesi-Ferretti et al., 2000); the overall welfare 
of a country (Mueller and Stratmann, 2000); the information and the participation of voters (Mudambi et al., 1995 and 
1999); the responsiveness of the government's choice to the preferences of the voters (Shugart, 2001); the relative 
power of the lobbies (Myerson, 1995); the incentives for politicians (Myerson, 1995; Ryker, 1982); the possibility of 
strategic choices of voters and candidates (Levin and Nalebuff, 1995); the complexity of the voting system (id.); the 
protection of the minorities  (id.; Rae, 1995; Sen, 1995); the risk of extreme choices (id.); the use of the vote as a 
"voice" device (Brennan and Hamlin, 1998; Sen, 1995)
1. For the time being, I did not find references to two further 
dimensions largely quoted in the political debate, at least in Italy: economic growth and the reshuffling of the political 
aristocracy. 
   This list is quite formidable, but fortunately we can rest on the general agreement that two of them are of 
paramount relevance, that is the efficiency in representing electors' will and the effect on the efficiency of the resulting 
government. I'll label the first dimension representativeness, shortened with R, and the second one governability, G, 
from the Italian neologism "governabilità". There are good reasons to privilege R and G. To choose the representatives 
and to summon  a government are   the basic aims of the electoral process. I've suggested elsewhere (see Ortona, 2002)  
that minor dimensions may be better dealt with in other moments of the political process. In addition, it is sensible to 
think that albeit there is a trade-off between G and R, other dimensions are lexicographic with respect to them. If this is 
so, the results we'll obtain here will keep their validity irrespective of the dimensions judged relevant. In any case, what 
follows deals only with the two quoted dimensions. The extension of the results to the case of three or more is a 
possible and interesting task - deferred to further inquiry. 
      G and R may be evaluated through the assessment of numerical  indicators,  hopefully plausible but 
unavoidably arbitrary. I will label them g and r respectively. One should not be shy to suggest that electoral policies 
may be based on the values of indicators: this is what happens every day in economic policies, frequently oriented by 
changes of decimals in quite rough indicators like aggregate inflation or GNP growth rate.  A  detailed description of 
the indicators I will employ here is  in appendix a.  Briefly, g depends on the number of parties and of Mps supporting 
the government, and r depends on the difference of seats attributed to parties under the system under exam and under 
proportional representation, supposed to be the most representative system. The range of both is the interval 0-1. 
   After the voting, it is obviously possible to simulate the Parliament that will result under all systems allowed 
for by the information collected through the votes (for instance, to assess the performance of Condorcet voting or of 
Borda count we need more than the first preferences of the voters); and consequently to evaluate g and r for each of 
them
2.   Results may be graphed, as in fig. 1.  
  There are three possibilities. First, a system may locate northeast of all the others, like the system labelled with 
?. I define this system dominant, and it is obviously the best one. Unfortunately, this system is very likely not to exist; 
in all the simulations I have made so far (see Ortona, 1998, 2000 and 2002; Bissey and Ortona, 2003) it did not manifest 
itself – hence the symbol. Second, a system may locate southwest of at least another, like system 3 with reference to 
                                                           
1 All previous references to  be read as "for instance". 
2 In what follows, I assume that majorities are always minimum winning coalitions of parties, and that coalitions must be made of 
parties adjacent on the left-right axis. These hypotheses may be substituted with more sophisticated ones in real-world applications of 
the rule, albeit they look  plausible and are commonly (but not without discussion) accepted in the literature.   
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system 2 (and to system ?, if it exists). I define such systems dominated, and they may safely be excluded: no need to 
consider system 3, if system 2, better on both dimensions, is available. Third, systems may be neither dominant nor 
dominated, like 1 and 2 in the graph (if ? does not exist), and like (usually) majoritarian voting and proportional 
representation in real world. I label these systems alternative. Obviously, the rule we look for is useful only if it allows 
to choose among alternative systems. 
 





3. Choosing among alternative systems.  
In order to compare the results of different electoral systems, we obviously need votes for different systems: a 
majoritarian vote, a proportional vote, a list of voters' ordered preference for Condorcet voting, and so on. For the 
moment, suppose that we actually have these data; we'll come back to this in the next section. Given the votes, every 
system considered will produce a potential Parliaments, and each of them will have a pair of values of g and r. If a 
system will result dominant, it is the good one, but as we noticed this result is very unlikely, given the trade-off between 
the two dimensions. What can  safely be done is to rule out dominated systems, like system 3 in the previous figure. 
This operation will probably reduce considerably the number of potential candidates. Suppose that we remain with 
three, like in fig. 1  if  system ? does not exist. Apparently,  what we need to compare them is a social utility function 
(SUF) -admittedly a quite formidable requirement, to say little. Actually, we may be satisfied with something less. 
  Let us admit that the the SUF  for electoral system is a Cobb-Douglas function in g and r, U = Ag
ar
b . We 
choose this form not only for its simplicity and versatility, but also for the meaning of a and b, the partial elasticities of 
U with reference to g and r respectively.  Now consider two systems, X e Y. We may write that 
 






where we denote for simplicity the values of X with lower-case letters and those of Y with capitals. In addition, 
let p = a/b, and hence a = bp. 
 




hence the condition may be written as   
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[2]  p > ln(R/r)/Ln(g/G)  
 
provided that g, or G, or both are <1
3. 
 
   The only a priori information we need to assess the fulfilment of the condition is the value of p, the ratio of the 
elasticities. I argue that this parameter may actually be provided by the political system. The ratio may be considered a 
proxy of the relative weight that the community assigns to an increase in the relative value of g and r. If for instance a -
say- 10% increase in g is valued more than the same increase in r, p>1, and viceversa.  I suggest that the Supreme Court 
-or someone else at a very high level- may decide the value of p. Alternatively, someone (but not the Parliament itself) 
may vote on its value. There are other possibilities. For instance, the community may "start" with a=b, and change the 
ratio for the next election if the entity in charge thinks that representativeness or governability have been excessive. 
Another possibility is that  the community orders the systems according to their supposed degree of proportionality, and 
chooses the first one (i.e. PPR) if the value of g  is above a given threshold; otherwise it moves to the second one, and 
so on. Under this rule, the best system is the most proportional one, provided that the governability reaches a given 
value (or viceversa, obviously).  I will not go deeper into this: what I claim is only -but it is not that little- that the 
problem of choosing the best electoral system may reasonably be reduced to that of choosing the relative importance of 
the two main dimensions
4. 
  [2] Allows for binary comparisons of (non-dominated) electoral systems, and hence to find out the Condorcet 
winner
5. The winner is the best system, to be adopted.  
  Alternatively, we may trace indifference curves and pick the system lying on the higher one, as follows. 
  The expression for the generic indifference curve r=r(U*,g) is 
 
[3]  r = (U*/A)
1/b/g
a/b    i.e. 
[3'] r =  W/g
p 
 
                                                           
3 This is the condition when g>G and R>r. If  g>G and r>R, or G>g and R>r, or g=G, or r=R, the choice is trivial. If G>g and r>R, 
the sign of inequality [2]  becomes <. 
4 Note that p may also be characterized in another, more suggestive way. p is the price in terms of a relative decrease of r that the  
community accepts to pay for a given relative increase of g (and 1/p the opposite). If for instance p =2, it is worthwhile to accept a 
20% reduction of r to gain a 10% increase in g. The proof follows. 
 
from U = Ag
ar






















dr/r = -p(dg/g)  
 
 
5 A Condorcet cycle may result only by chance, and may be ruled out simply by adding a further figure while rounding the results.  
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      This provides an alternative way to compare couples of systems. For a given value of g,  the value of r 
increases with that of W, and the value of W with that of U*. Consequently, it is sufficient to solve equation [3'] for W, 
given r,g, and p, for each system considered. The system with the highest value of W is the best one. If you are 
sufficiently able in computer plotting, the solution may appear graphically. An example is in fig. 2, where indifference 
curves for an hypothetical value of p have been plotted across the (hypothetical) data of fig. 1. In absence of ?, and 
ruling out system 3, dominated, the winner is system 2. 
 
Figure 2. Choosing among four hypothetical electoral systems in the g-r space. 
 
 
4. Choosing the system after the vote.  
We left aside a main point, namely how to collect electoral results for different systems, in order to evaluate g 
and r for each. A possible solution is to run simulations with fictitious data corresponding (more or less) to the real 
features of the case. Another one is to draw on historical data to collect average data for the parameters. The limits of 
these approaches are obvious: the decision must be based on questionable data, hence the aim of the method -to choose 
a system as "objectively" as possible- is reached in a very limited way.  
    It seems much more advisable to choose the system after the elections. Electors may easily provide the 
information necessary to compute out the resulting  Parliament   under a lot of different systems, and hence g and r. For 
instance, Ortona (2002) simulated the results of nine systems supposing that each voter provided a majoritarian vote,  a 
proportional one and a complete ordering of preferences.  To cast jointly the first two is common practice in Germany 
and in Italy, and the ordering of more relevant preferences (which would suffice) is requested wherever the single 
transferable vote (STV) is adopted. Note that this voting set allows for the simulation of additional systems, first of all 
the STV itself.  
  To choose the system after the voting may be very useful from another point of view too.  According to Shugart 
(2001) and Shugart and Wattenberg (2000), mixed-members electoral systems  are the best ones because, inter alia, 
they force the parties to try to maximize both the personal link of the candidate with the voters and the validity of 
nation-wide programs. The same result may be obtained if the parties do not know what will be the relative weight of 
the majoritarian and of the proportional components. More generally, if parties, and other concerned subjects, like 
lobbyists, do not know with certainty which system will ultimately be adopted, they will have less room to exploit the  
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pitfalls of each systems. Obviously, to choose the system a posteriori is possible only if the rule established by electoral 
norms  provides undisputable results -as is the case here.   
 
 
5. An illustrative experiment.  
Just to give an example, in this section I will illustrate  the results  of some simulations, run at the Laboratory of 
experimental and simulative economics of the University of Piemonte Orientale
6.  The Parliament is supposed to have 
100 members. The  data set is a representative, nation-wide survey of the complete preferences for (then) existing 
parties of Italian voters in 1997
7. It is useful to stress that the Italian electoral system was perfect proportionality (with 
an average district magnitude close to 20) until 1994, and has then been changed into a mixed-member system. Italian 
voters are consequently requested to vote for both a majoritarian and a proportional competition, in an environment 
characterised by a high number of parties.
8 The simulation program allows presently to consider eleven systems. The 
method employed is that of equation [3'] above; hence the crucial figure is the value of W. Results are summarized in 
table 1. 
 
Table 1.  Summary of the simulation of 11 electoral systems. 
 
System  w 
   values of p: 
  1      2      0.5 
r  g  Seats of the  
governing 
coalition 
Proportional  0.36  0.13  0.60  1  0.36  58 
Threshold prop. °  0.33  0.12  0.54  0.893  0.37  61 
Prized prop. +  0.43  0.26  0.55  0.714  0.60  60 
First-past-the-post  0.29  0.18  0.37  0.464  0.63  63 
Two-round  0.29  0.18  0.37  0.464  0.63  63 
Condorcet  0.29  0.18  0.37  0.464  0.63  63 
Borda  0.29  0.18  0.37  0.464  0.63  63 
Approval  0.30  0.11   0.48   0.786  0.38  64 
Mixed-member 1 *  0.34  0.20  0.44  0.571  0.59  59 
Mixed-member 2 #  0.32  0.12  0.54  0.893  0.36  58 
VAP §  0.56  0.35  0.70     0.882  0.63  58 
 
Cues: 
°  5% threshold. 
+  the majority prize is 15 seats. 
*  25 seats elected under proportional system, 75 under first-past-the-post. 
# 75 seats elected under proportional system, 25 under first-past-the-post.  
§  VAP is a suggested new system. It is described in detail in Ortona, 2000 and 2002.  a summary is in appendix b. 
   Remember that if p>1, governability is more appreciated than representativeness (see the text), and viceversa if p<1. 
 
                                                           
6 A first version of the program has been created by Roberto Trinchero, of the University of Torino (see Trinchero, 1998). The 
version employed here is the second, updated as a part of his Laurea dissertation by  Monella (see Monella, 2002) at the University 
of Piemonte Orientale. A third version, completely renewed, is under construction (see Bissey and Ortona, 2003). 
7 Data collected by ISPO, Milano. 
8 The high number of parties may be the product of the long history of proportional representation, and this makes Italy a peculiar 
case for study. However, there are clues that the number of parties tend actually to be high whenever plurality or majority do not  
enforce the law of Duverger. An instance are the British elections of 2001, where more than 70 parties tackled the first-past-the-post 
competition.   
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  With p = 1, the  winner  is VAP; if we rule it out, the winner is prized proportionality. Note that in general 
proportional systems perform better then non-proportional ones. Remarkably, the same holds for p=2: assigning 
governability twice the value of representativeness is not enough to make non-proportional systems preferable, at least 
for Italian voters.  Not unexpectedly, if p=0.5 the best system (but for VAP again) is proportionality. Mixed members 
perform quite well, thus confirming some recent suggestions (see Shugart, 2001 or Shugart and Wattenberg, 2000). 
  
 
6. Conclusions.  
The conclusions reduce to two major claims and to a major caveat. The first claim is that it is possible to choose 
"objectively" the best electoral system,  on the basis of the values of given indicators, as commonly done in economic 
policy making. The second claim is that it is possible and advisable to choose the electoral system after the polls.  
  Unfortunately, the caveat is mighty. The whole procedure rests upon the assumptions that the ratio between the 
(incremental) utility of the two relevant dimensions may be read as the ratio of the parameters of an utility function,  
and that the arguments of the function define it conveniently. The first assumption is a little demanding, but the second 
much more so. The values of the parameters, and hence the actual position  of the function, as well as its derivatives, 
depend crucially on the specific form of the indicators.  There is nothing "natural" in the formulas for g and r we 
employed here; and other formulas would provide different figures. 
  However, there are ways to reduce the importance of the objection. One is to resort to the "decision maker 
approach", as suggested above. Another one is to provide the decisors  with  examples of typical results, transforming 
the choice of the ratio between the elasticities into an experts' judgement. It is also possible to better standardize the 
indexes. All these matters require deeper inquiry, so they are postponed to further research.  
   Finally, the reader is advised not to consider the simulations of section 5 as conclusive. They are too limited to 
be more than illustrative.  Further papers will be more conclusive.  
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Appendix a. The indicators for R and G
9. 
 
Index of representativeness, r. 
 
The formula is 
           n                      n 
rj = 1-(Σ|Sj,i – Spp,i|) / (Σ|Su,i - Spp,i |) 
          i=1                   i=1 
 
where j refers to the electoral system, n is the number of parties, Sj,i is the number of seats obtained by party i 
under system j,  Spp,i is the number of seats obtained by party i under perfect proportionality rule, and Su,i is the number 
of seats obtained by party i if all the seats go to the largest party
10. 
  The index reads as follows. First sum: I assume that R is perfect under perfect proportionality rule, PPR. Hence 
the loss of representativeness incurred by party i is the (absolute) difference between the seats it would get under PPR 
and those actually obtained. Summing this loss across all the parties we obtain the total loss of R. Second sum: In order 
to normalize (0 to 1) this value, I divide it by the maximum possible loss of R. This maximum is obtained when “winner 
takes all” in a very strict sense, that is when the relative majority party takes all the seats. 1-the ratio of the sums: up to 
now we got a loss of representativeness index, normalized in the range 0-1. Subtracting it from 1 we transform it into a 
representativeness  index. The index is quite similar to one suggested by Mudambi (1996); the main difference is that it 
is normalized. However, it is not normalized across constituencies
11.  
 
Example.  Suppose three parties, L, C and R, in a parliament of 100 seats. Under PPR they obtain 49, 31 and 20 
seats respectively, under majority (M) 90, 10 and 0, and under some other system (S)  60, 25 and 15. The value of rm is 
1- 82/102 = 0.196, and the value of rs is 1- 22/102 = 0.784. That of rppr is obviously 1: 1- 0/102. 
 
 
   
Index of governability, g. 
 
Governability  depends on the number of parties of the governing coalition that may destroy the majority if they 
withdraw, m; and on the share of seats of the majority, f.  m is more important, so I add lexicographically the f-
component to the m-component. Hence the index is made of the sum of two terms, the first related to m, gm, and the 
second related to f, gf. The range of the second term is the difference between successive values of the first:  the term in 
m defines a lower and an upper boundary, and the term in f specifies the value of the index between them. 
                                                           
9 The  discussion of r is taken from Ortona, 2000. 
10 The value of Su,i is the total number of seats for the largest party, and 0 for all the others. If several parties are the largest ones ex 
aequo, I take the one which is the largest under most systems in the case considered.  
11 Actually, to assume that the maximum of R corresponds to PPR is quite limiting. The number of parties that run under PPR 
depends upon a lot of factors, mostly upon the cost of running. If this cost is high, even PPR may correspond to a low “real” 
representativeness. Consequently, the representativeness of a given system is assessed only against representativeness under PPR for 
a given set or rules. This limitation may be serious if running costs (and other obstacles to participation of parties to the electoral 
competition) are important. Another objection that may come to  mind is less relevant. The representation of minor parties is affected  
strongly by the number of MPs to be elected in every constituency.  However, it is perfectly possible to assess the result of a virtual 
large-constituency proportional election to be used as a benchmark for the evaluation of r, even if real ones are small. In this case, 
PPR with real district will appear as an additional system. With an unique constituency of 100 seats, as in this paper, the index 
suggested by Lijphart (1999, ch. 7) excludes only parties with less than 0.75% of the votes.  
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   The limits defined by gm are simply 1/m (upper boundary) and 1/(m+1) (lower boundary). For instance, if the 
government is supported by just one party, g is comprised between 0.5 and 1; if it supported by two g is comprised 
between 0.333 and 0.5, and so on.  Note that the addition of new parties produces smaller and smaller decreases in g, as 
it should be
12.  The number of seats of the majority coalition specifies the value of g in the given range. The figure to be 
added to the lower boundary, gf,  depends from the lead of the majority coalition, according to the following proportion: 
 




gf = [1/m - 1/(m+1)] (f-t/2)/(t-t/2) 
 
where t is the total number of seats in the Parliament. 
 
For instance, if  there are 100 seats and the governing majority is made up of one party, and enjoys the support of 
59 MPs, the value of gf is 0.09 (9/50*1/2). This value must be added to 0.5, to give a value of g  equal to 0.59. In sum, 
the formula for g is: 
 
g = gm + gf =  1/(m+1) + [1/m - 1/(m+1)] (f-t/2)/(t-t/2) 
 
where m = number of crucial
13 parties supporting the Government, f  = number of seats of the majority, t = total 
number of seats. The maximum value of g is 1, when  a party has  all the seats; the lowest is close to 2/t, when all the 
parties have  one seat, sufficiently close to 0 to justify the claim that the range of g is the interval (0,1] (actually, the 
lower limit of g tends to 0 as t tends to infinity). 
                                                           
12 For instance, the difference of stability between a 7-party and a 8-party coalition is much smaller that that between a coalition of 
two parties and a single-party majority. 
13 The number of crucial parties is the number of parties such that the Government is no more supported by a majority if one of them 
leaves the coalition.  Under the hypothesis of MWC this number is equal to the number of parties that form the majority; but this is 
not true under the hypothesis  of MWC of adjacent parties.  
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 Appendix b.  The VAP system
14. 
 
      It runs through two stages. In the first, the Chamber is elected with a proportional system: perfect 
proportionality, threshold proportionality or single transferable vote. Here I assume perfect proportionality. The 
resulting majority forms the government, which gets its confidence vote as usual. From this moment on, the votes of the 
MPs belonging to the largest party(ies) and  voting in accord with the government are given a weight a > 1. I label such 
party(ies) crucial. This is by and large equivalent to a majority premium: for instance, if a = 1.5, there are 100 seats, and 
the majority is made up of 60, the majority has up to  90 votes (see below), and the opposition only 40.  
   The rationale for this vote-weighting is to allow the government to maintain a lead even if small members of 
the supporting coalition defect. Small parties lose their blackmailing power. Only if large parties (or a sufficiently large 
portion of their MPs) defect the government loses the majority. 
    It follows that a is computed according to the  formula: 
 
            m          m               m                                        m              m 
(1)      aXi = (aXi + T - Xi)/2 + y    i.e.  a =   (T - Xi +2y)/ Xi 
            i=1        i=1            i=1                                      i=1            i=1 
 
where X is the number of seats of the m largest parties supporting the government, and T the total of seats. This 
way the government keeps a majority of y if small members defect. If we want the government to be guaranteed if all 
members but the largest one defect, (1) reduces obviously to 
 
(2)   Xa = (Xa +T–X)/2 + y    i.e.  a =  (T-X+2y)/X 
 
where X  is the number of seats of the largest party. Under this rule, a coalition would collapse if and only if a 
large member of it withdraws -which looks quite fair. Note that the number of crucial parties may also be decided on 
practical grounds. For instance, the electoral constitution may establish that it is worth “paying” a value of a equal to 
2.5 to obtain one crucial party, of 2 to obtain two, of 1.5 to obtain three and so on. If these thresholds are not reached, it 
means that correcting the (perfect or not) proportionality is too costly.  
 
Example. Suppose a 100-seat parliament with 10, 10, 34, 17 and 29 seats for parties A to E. The Government is 
made by  C and D. C is the only large party, so (2) applies, and the value of a is 2. The majority enjoys 85 votes (34 
times 2 + 17), and the opposition 49. If D withdraws, the Government keeps the majority, with 68 votes  against 66. If it 
is C to withdraw, the former majority has only 17 votes against 83. Finally, the majority may collapse if some members 
of C defect: if D does not, at least 12 (or 13). With 12 defectors, the  government has 61 votes (22 times 2 + 17) and the  
opposition 61 too. 
   In other words, it is not the real parliament to vote, but a virtual one, where the number of votes is given by 
those  of the opposition, plus those of the small parties of the majority, plus those of the large parties of the majority 
times a, 2 in the example. If there are no defections, the number of virtual seats in the example is 134. Obviously, if a 
member of the majority votes for the opposition his 2 votes reduce to 1. 
      The index g will be computed with reference to the virtual Chamber. In the example its value is 1/2 + 
(13/72)(1-1/2) = 0.59. To compute r we must create  a perfectly proportional partition of seats in the virtual Chamber 
                                                           
14 From Ortona, 2002.  
12 
(see the formula); to do that we simply assign the virtual seats (134, in the example) to the parties according to their 
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